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Slow: Towards a decelerated urbanism  
Abdul Shaban and Ayona Datta 
 
In June 2015, the CEO of Kochi smart city in India suddenly resigned. This came as a 
shock to many in the sector, given that the inauguration of the first IT building in Kochi 
smart city was scheduled in July. As stories began to emerge of a three million GBP 
corruption racket run by the CEO, rumours also circulated that he had been removed by 
TECOM Dubai holdings (the investor) once this was established (Praveen 2015). The 
corruption was related to the purchase and use of inferior quality materials at the price of 
high-spec building materials quoted in the tenders. As TECOM ordered an immediate audit 
of its finances in Kochi smart city, high level ministerial committees and the Smart City 
Council of India rushed to do damage control. An independent Audit report thereafter 
revealed several inconsistencies in the project, finding that the terms and conditions of the 
smart city and its claims to the provision of jobs had been diluted. 
In itself, this story can be seen as the ‘ordinary’ story of postcolonial urbanism. It 
highlights the complex web of inconsistencies, ambiguities, corruption, political power 
games and ‘independent’ investigations that in the end have failed to bring about the 
transparency, efficiency and formalisation aspired for in postcolonial modernity. Crucially, 
this ordinary story underlines the perceived ‘slowness’ that often leads to the deceleration and 
stalling of mega-projects. It is in this context that planning and bureaucracy surrounding the 
impending urban age is subject to the logics of speed. Speeding up urbanization through 
tropes like smart cities it is argued will address corruption, bureaucracy, inertia, nepotism, 
and general unaccountability of those in power that have characterised postcolonial urbanism 
so far. Slowness here is framed pejoratively, as a stretching of time made possible both by an 
illegible state and ‘anti-development’ activists working outside the limits of law. Crucially, 
‘slowness’ is constructed as a ‘handicap’ of development, modernity and progress. It is 
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ironical then that smart cities as a national urbanization priority in India claims to break this 
historical connection between urbanization and its vices, but ultimately succumbs to its 
forces. 
In the introduction to this book, Datta argues for a critical lens of ‘speed, time and 
duration’ with which the conceptualisation, master planning, production and materialisation 
of new cities across the global south are to be examined. She calls these ‘fast cities’ since 
they engage in ‘claimsmaking’ (Lauermann 2015) to urban futures through the imperatives of 
speed. They combine rhetorics, imagery and ‘futurology’ around a crisis of urbanization, 
migration and climate change to present speed as a way out of crises. And it is by 
constructing relative binaries of speed between ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ urbanization paradigms that 
new cities claim to ‘leapfrog’ into sustainable urban futures.  In doing so, Datta argues in the 
introduction that a critical lens of speed can challenge dominant narratives of 
neoliberalisation and global gentrification in postcolonial urbanism. Each subsequent 
chapter’s examination of urbanization in this book critiques the ‘re-emergence of the 
postcolonial state desirous of distinction, differentiation and disentanglement from the 
“colonial burden” – a reinvention through new utopian imaginings of the city.’  
The smart city Kochi story nevertheless shows how the faultlines of speed are written 
into its own imperatives. Smart cities in India are the new fast cities introduced with a wave 
of rhetoric around their urgency and efficiency in the global urban age. Speed however, is the 
new mode of enunciation of sovereign power, where the “relationship between popular 
control of government and private control of means of production, distribution and exchange 
is a fundamental dichotomy in society that tends to play out in favour of business interest” 
(Davies 2004:27). Speed in this context becomes the imperative often at the cost of rights, 
justice and democracy as we see in several chapters of this book. Yet speed and accelerated 
urbanization do not in themselves address the historical relations between power and capital. 
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Indeed, if anything, the smart city Kochi story suggests that speed now reconfigures historical 
relations between state bureaucracy and nepotism into new relations of venality between the 
state and private sector. Yet, several chapters in this book have highlighted that in this 
transformed relationship, it is grassroots resistance that is often framed as the ‘flipside’ of 
speed since it contradicts what social and political elites see as their ‘democratic’ rights to 
capital, mobility and middle-class lifestyles.  
On the other hand, it is precisely for the above reasons that socialist or autocratic 
countries such as China or UAE are seen as progressive by much of the Indian middle-classes 
when it comes to ‘fast’ development. Indeed, the urgency of responding to repeated crises has 
evoked a critique in the global south that planning needs to become more responsive and 
therefore faster and proactive. New cities are now subject to the rhetorics of ‘streamlining’, 
‘leapfrogging’, ‘smoothening’, ‘fast tracking’, ‘simplifying’, and several other phrases that 
imply the suspension of a democratic state and the ascendance of a particularly aggressive 
form of the entrepreneurial state (Mazzucato 2014). Speed, when prioritised over democracy 
and citizenship becomes a mode of governmentality, a tool of accumulation by dispossession 
and of forced displacement. Speed articulates an ‘acquiescent citizenship’ whereby support 
rather than critique of fast cities becomes the new civic duty of citizens.  
Despite the rise of a new state apparatus around speed, there are simultaneous 
attempts to depoliticise speed. Typically growth coalitions put their case for fast growth as 
‘value-free’ at a political level, whilst mobilising local media interests and backing pro-
growth politicians and strategies (Houghton 1996; Logan and Molotoch 1987).  Emerging 
political battles along religious, regional, ethnic, caste and class lines in India (Shaban 2010), 
rampaging civil wars in Africa, Afghanistan and other parts of global south are examples of 
what fast growth may have contributed to at a global scale. At the core of this new (fast) 
urbanization lies the primitive accumulation of capital – the assimilation and capture of non-
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capitalist means of production into capitalist ones (the eviction, encroachments, and 
acquisitions are major forms through which the accumulation is accomplished), as an aspect 
of the formal imposition of ‘regimes of accumulation’ by the sovereign state. This fast 
urbanization produces a subsistence-accumulation duality (Bhattacharya and Sanyal 
2011:42), whereby the accumulation economy breaks the subsistence economy to produce 
structural disadvantages in marginal livelihoods and ways of life. This is most evident now in 
the ‘land wars’ waging across several regions of the global south where the interests of 
urbanization are deflected by peasant articulations of rights to land and livelihoods. New 
regimes of speed construct the loss of livelihoods as collateral to the ‘public’ interests of 
development and economic prosperity. Peasants are now the new frontiers of fast cities and 
fast urbanization, because their existence is often seen as a threat to speed (Goldman 2012). 
This legitimisation of the need to remove peasants from what has traditionally been 
understood as their rightful economic space presents the dialectics of fast cities between 
urban and rural economies, landscapes and lifestyles and by extension between speed and 
slowness.  
In this book then we have analysed the rhetorics, politics and practices that follow the 
ideologies and moral imperatives of fast cities. As several chapters have argued, the 
consequences of producing new cities and urbanization using the rhetorics of ‘fast-tracking’,  
‘leapfrogging’, and several other memes of speed  produces a violence of development that 
bypasses processes of democratic inclusion and citizenship. However slowing down the 
process of urbanization does not in itself imply the resurrection of social, spatial and 
environmental justice. Indeed, much of the legitimisation of fast cities as we have argued in 
this book follow a model of 'entrepreneurial urbanization' (Datta 2015) that has bypassed 
local complexities and specificities of capital, governance and citizenship. As Bhattacharya 
and Sanyal note, “this unhinging of the cities from their regional or national economies 
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manifests in the dissociation of the new class of workers engaged in immaterial production 
from regional lifestyles and prevalent social modes of reproduction” (2011:44). They find 
themselves distant from the terms of engagement with ‘civil society’ where the demand and 
aspirations of middle class is often articulated (Bhattacharya and Sanyal 2011:42). This 
surplus population are then forced in the hugely informalised and segmented labour market, 
having to negotiate with agents of the state to secure their lives and livelihoods.  
Our purpose in this book therefore has been to show that speed, time and duration are 
essential components of a critical urbanism. This does not imply that new cities that face 
‘blockades’ and manifest slower than others are necessarily democratic. We have argued 
rather for a more careful consideration of time as a way to enrich (rather than bypass) 
processes of democracy, citizenship, sustainability and belonging in the making of cities. The 
chapters in this book highlight that while inertia in itself does not embody any inherent 
guarantees of equality or inclusion, attention to processes of ensuring justice, rights and 
democracy rather than efficiency might necessarily need to slow down the pace of 
urbanization. 
Decelerated urbanism: A series of provocations  
 
“Government is often characterised as being too slow, but speed should not be a 
driver in itself. It could be that we need a form of slow government, predicated on a similar 
idea of slowness that underpins the slow-food movement: valuing craft, provenance, 
attention to detail, shared responsibility, while creating a platform for dialogue and 
community through human-centredness. The fast “push-button democracy” might well be 
the last thing we need” (Hill 2012). 
In light of massive structural shifts across the global south, we need to take heed of 
Hill’s (2012) statement above. Hill captures the challenges of growing ‘too fast’ by 
suggesting that ‘speed’ as a model of urbanization sacrifices the democratic processes that are 
usually relatively slow given their attention to the processes of consultation, deliberation and 
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planning. It is in this context that we argue for a decelerated urbanism in order to engage with 
processes of democracy and citizenship in planning and governance.  
But what are the alternative development regimes that produce just and democratic 
futures? Almost 20 years ago, Imbroscio (1998) outlined six elements of an alternative urban 
development regime. These are strategies to (i) increase human capital, (ii) increase 
community economic stability (iii) proper accounting of development costs and benefits 
through public balance sheets, (iv) the development of asset specificity, (v) economic 
localism, and (vi) development of alternative institutions. Imbroscio’s paradigm of local 
economic development are still relevant to urban America’s problems. But in the context of 
the global south, his call to cities to adopt strategies of entrepreneurial mercantilism, 
community-based economic development and municipal enterprise does not capture the 
entrepreneurial capacity of the state-private sector alliance. They also do not respond to the 
increasing transformation of state-citizen relations and therefore of the nature of citizenship 
in the global south. 
In the rest of this final concluding chapter we engage in a series of provocations that 
imagine a multiplicity of different urban futures to that currently enacted across the global 
south. In provocation #1, we propose slow and ‘sensory’ urbanism for ushering new 
possibilities of urban citizenship, community and spatial justice.  We propose that attention to 
the rhythms of everyday life in cities through sensory and embodied engagement with 
urbanization will produce more equitable distribution of power and resources among the 
grassroots.  Provocation #2 emphasizes on slow governance leading to more humane, 
differentiated, deliberative, participative and contextualized form of urbanism rather than a 
‘push-button’ democracy.  We propose that a transition to slow policy and governance might 
hold the key to urban futures which are in the long term resilient to future crises. In 
provocation #3, we argue for the need for democratization of common to stop ‘land wars’ 
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which the entrepreneurial state is ushering in Global South. We propose that the 
decommoditisation of land and the notion of territorial commons is key to an articulation of a 
decelerated urbanisation. Here current urbanization paradigms need to consider the 
materialities of social and spatial justice that are embodied in claims to land and livelihoods. 
Finally, in provocation #4, we call for alternative grassroots utopias that can mobilise and 
materialise what Lefebvre call the ‘impossible possible’ in future urbanization paradigms. 
Provocation #1: Slow urbanism 
Our first provocation is to produce and counter the praxis of fast urbanism. Removing 
the prerogative of speed in the management and implementation of urbanization projects 
opens up new possibilities for urban citizenship. This is not to establish binaries or moral 
positioning between slow and fast cities; rather to radically reorganise the notion of time, 
speed and duration in finding local approaches to design and urban planning. Such attention 
cannot be paid through acquiescence with the entrepreneurial agenda of the state; rather 
through a dialectical relationship between the language and performance of rights and the 
terms and conditions of citizenship imposed by the entrepreneurial state.  
We draw here upon a range of ‘slow’ movements that emphasise the local, sensory 
and embodied nature of urbanism. One of these, the slow food movement is an international 
NGO that focuses on the sensory and embodied qualities of food as an alternative to 
globalised fast food systems. It emerged in 1986 and was initiated by an Italian Food writer 
who got alarmed by the opening of McDonald’s restaurant next to the Piazza di Spagna in 
Rome. This movement was started to keep local community economies vital. The 
movement’s aim was to protect the ‘rights to taste’ by protecting traditional food products, 
promoting pleasure of eating (including social sharing of meal) and promoting traditional 
agricultural methods and techniques, among other initiatives (Mayer and Knox 2006).  
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Akin to the slow food movement, 'slow cities' or Cittaslow is also an alternative 
movement promoting local sustainability claims to address larger concerns of spatial justice 
in cities and regions.  Cittaslow draws inspiration from the slow food movement and 
positions itself explicitly against the “corporate-centred/mainstream economic development 
policies” (Mayer and Knox: 2006: 322) arguing against the speed and homogenising qualities 
of globalisation that reproduce a specific template of neoliberal urbanism across the world.  It 
aims for “creation of a progressive network of small towns – Slow Cities or Citta Lente – that 
set out to follow an alternative urban development agenda. It was established in 1999 by the 
Mayor of four Italian towns (Greve in Chianti, Bra, Orvieto and Positano) and president of 
Slow Food (Lowry 2011). Cittaslow has 54 certification criteria of which 24 are compulsory. 
These criterial relate to the six spheres, namely, (i) environmental policies, (ii) infrastructure 
policies, (iii) technologies and facilities for environmental quality, (iv) safeguarding 
autochthonous production, (v) hospitality, and (vi) awareness (Lowry 2011: 3). In order to be 
certified by Cittaslow, a city must also have a population 50,000 or less, which implies that 
the potential for transformation lies in small and medium towns. There are now a total of 141 
certified Cittaslow in 23 countries in 2011 by Cittaslow international (2011). Although all of 
these cities are in Europe their policies to incorporate slowness and conviviality in urban life 
can be translated in a diversity of regional and local contexts. 
As Pink (2008, 106) notes, the principles of Cittaslow ‘engage their participants 
sensorially rather than simply economically, intellectually or emotionally.’ Pink further notes 
that a ‘sensory approach to urbanism can produce insights that contribute, alongside 
conventional methodologies, to our understandings of human engagements in sustainable 
urban development processes.’ Cittaslow emphasises local economic strengths that 
contributes to equality and community mobility. Mayer and Knox further argue, “Slow cities 
are places where citizens and local leaders pay attention to local history and utilize the 
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distinctive local context to develop in better and more sustainable ways” (2006: 322). But 
Cittaslow, like several other movements around local sustainability is not without its 
weaknesses. Its localisation of policy and governance embodies inherent assumptions that has 
been subject of continued debate in recent urban studies scholarship. The assumption that the 
local is somehow more equal and equitable than the regional or national assumes that 
networks and structures of power and capital do not work within and across local 
communities. It also assumes that devolution of political power to the ‘local’ (including 
urban local bodies and local authorities) encouraged by international development agencies in 
global south countries will automatically ensure equitable distribution of capital and 
resources and decision-making across socially and economically marginalised groups. While 
several countries in the global south have initiated policies of Agenda 21 to decentralise and 
localise decision-making powers, the emphasis on localism often assumes that greater 
freedom or ‘spatial liberalism’ (Clarke and Cochrane 2014) will promote innovation and 
greater engagement among civil society.  In countries such as India and China, this localism 
has instead consolidated the power of local elites and middle classes while further excluding 
the marginalised to the peripheries. Moreover, as many of the chapters in this book point out, 
localism can itself become a form of ‘statecraft’ whereby power, inclusion and participation 
in local decision-making is mediated and controlled by the state. 
A slow urbanism in the global south would move beyond a mere recognition of local 
history and contexts in the manner advocated by Cittaslow or other ‘slow’ movements to a 
historiography of social inequalities, accumulation, dispossession and exclusion. Slow 
urbanism would articulate an attention to the prosaic transactions of everyday life in cities, to 
emotions, feelings and experiences of those who inhabit the city, of those who are directly 
affected by the economic imperatives of urbanization and fast paced growth. This means a 
thick description of the ways in which social inequalities have been historically connected to 
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urban development, a critical analysis of the contexts in which these social inequalities have 
been understood through linear time, and a study of the ways in which the notion of cyclical 
time has been devalued in critical urban geography often to the detriment of subaltern 
marginalised groups. In short, slow urbanism will not just acknowledge the spatio-temporal 
cycle of inequalities and exclusions, but will engage, debate and seek to address these 
repeatedly during the cycles of urbanization.  
What would a slow urbanism look like? At the first instance it would take heed of 
cyclical time. In the introduction to this volume, Datta draws upon Lefebvre’s notion of 
rhythmanalysis, which “concerns the everyday, rites, ceremonies, fetes, rules and laws, there 
is always something new and unforeseen that introduces itself into repetitive difference” 
(Lefebvre 2004: 6). This is fundamentally in opposition to the shaping of fast cities through 
the marking of linear time in global urban crises of migration, urbanization and climate 
change. Slow urbanism takes heed of what Lefebvre notes as “the lived, the carnal, the body” 
(2004: 9) in processes and policies of urbanization and would lay the foundations of future 
urbanization on social justice and citizenship. Lefebvre notes, “we know that a rhythm is 
slow or lively only in relation to other rhythms (often our own: those of our walking, our 
breathing, our heart) (Lefebvre 2004: 10). We can make these carceral rhythms feature in 
urbanization by considering how the body occupies the processes and practices of 
urbanization, not just in being present in new cities, but also by being rendered invisible by 
fast urbanism. We can further examine the dialectical relation between the notion of linear 
time in the fast construction of new cities and the notion of cyclical time in the ghost cities 
left behind after the construction boom. Slow urbanism would allow for a more nuanced 
connection between the rhythms of global urban crises, economic downturns and migration 
explosion and the cyclical time of exclusions, dispossessions and expulsions. A slow 
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urbanism would prioritise the time needed in the making of ordinary cities rather than the 
speed of making fast cities.  
Provocation #2: Slow governance 
Our critique of fast cities in this book has sought to argue that speed embodies the 
logics of capital accumulation and growth, which are engaged in the governance of 
‘population’ rather than the advancement of diverse citizenships. This fast urbanism is 
promoted through the assumption that speed (aka efficiency) can achieve ‘good governance’.  
Fast cities are a ‘gold rush’ for the ‘experts (Bhatia 2016) which has led not only to 
North-South transfer of models of urban governmentality but also increasingly to South-
South collaborations and partnerships between nation states and urban municipalities. All the 
cities studied in this volume have significant involvement of experts such as IT consultants, 
architects, planners, state officials in the North and South who are continuously looking for 
avenues to further their growth through consultancy, providing expert advice and exporting 
their men and technologies to market new ‘governance models’ in the global south. This fast 
governance market assumes uniform conditions of economy, ecology, polity and social 
behaviours. A good example of this is the recent national urbanization drive in India to create 
100 smart cities which has become an architype of ‘fast policies’ for ‘fast cities’, which 
advocate information technology driven solutions to all problems from traffic, security to e-
governance.  
In this drive, fast governance through different forms of communication systems, new 
media technologies and ICT have become a euphemism for democratic participation and 
citizenship. The faster the channels of governance, it is argued, the more efficient and 
transparent the system of governance. To this end, we have seen in this volume how nation 
states have begun to radically change the terms and conditions of citizenship, territorial 
belonging and democratic participation through rule of law and judiciary. Efficiency is now a 
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cul-de-sac of governance where often, the curation of facebook likes, shares and twitter 
retweets, or what Dan Hill calls ‘push-button’ democracy has begun to stand for deliberative 
and participatory models of governance. Indeed in China, India and other global south 
countries, citizenship has increasingly begun to mean compliance and participation in state 
entrepreneurial models of policy and governance. 
It is not surprising then that fast governance remains geared towards restricting 
dissent, since dissent inherently 'slows' down its pace. This extends to areas of public 
disclosure law, right to information, community participation in planning processes, and land 
acquisition as shown in several chapters of this book. Yet exclusion, polarization (economic 
and political), disarticulation (Banerjee-Guha 2009:106) and ‘protestations’ remain major 
characteristics of mega-urbanization and city making in the global south today. The present 
paradigm of fast policy led by a global neoliberalism garners increasing support from the 
middle classes, weakening grassroots movement and often perpetuates plutocracy and 
majoritarianism in the name of democracy (CASUMM 2006). The poor are reduced to ‘vote 
banks’, and their interests are pejoratively interpreted. This in turn creates “shareholder 
democracy” (Durington 2011:209) through industrial, house-owners and shareowners 
association enjoying the ‘club good’ benefits (Atkinson and Blandy 2006) that fundamentally 
violate basic (social) democratic principles. While technology governance is now an integral 
part of state governance, its claims to accelerated results and efficiency is highly overstated 
and misleading. Indeed, fast governance has begun to stand for a governance by exception. 
It is in this context that we need an alternative and radically different model of slow 
governance. Slow governance should not be misinterpreted as a return to the model of 
nepotism and micro bureaucracy; rather as a considerable slowing down of the speed of 
urbanization that will provide opportunities to apply ‘slow thinking’ (Kahneman 2002) and 
reasoned approach to the contexts. Slow governance would allow for innovation and 
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entrepreneurialism in ways that enrich rather than erase the potentialities of a variety of 
citizenship practices and performances. But it would do this without the need for embedding 
citizenship within the spaces of corporate run e-governance sites such as those owned by 
facebook, google or twitter. It would instead enrich and encourage a diversity of citizenships 
from the intimate to the global across various spaces and times. We elaborate further on this 
in the next section. 
 
Provocation #3: Democratize the commons  
 There is a side to the ‘speed’ with which urbanization has been conceived and 
executed in the global south that has not yet been explicitly connected to the land question. 
Examining the ‘land wars’ between the private investors and farmers in India, Levien (2012: 
8) notes that the Indian state appears to be caught between the land requirements of its 
liberalized growth model and the exigencies of electoral democracy. This observation is 
significant since the Indian government as a representative democracy is elected by a 
population that is still largely rural and yet is driven by the aspirations of a rising urban 
middle classes which desire increased global investment into its cities and regions in order to 
benefit from its prosperity. It is therefore stuck in a conundrum – while its grandiose plans of 
attracting investment to speed up urbanization regularly collides with the more prosaic 
realities of making land available for this investment to materialise.  
One of the key aspects of a decelerating urbanism and slow governance would be to 
overturn the notion that land as a form of livelihood or commons can only become productive 
if converted to real-estate. In other words, the fairy-tale of fast urbanization makes us believe 
that development can only occur when governance of land is tied to urbanization. In countries 
such as India and China, the real estate sector remains the highest growing sector, where the 
capital from other sectors are invested due to high speculative returns. The speculation, 
monetization and marketization of land requires property rights which is often acquired from 
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peasants at cheap rate or transferred by governments to individuals by acquiring commons or 
public land. As Schindler (2015) has suggested, countries in the global south now are more 
interested in the governance of territories through which they aim to govern populations. In a 
country like India, land acquisition by the state and corporate sector in the last two decades or 
so have emerged as the priority of national development policy. It is assumed that land 
transfer to global enterprises by the entrepreneurial state will create significant benefits to the 
people and aid to the economic growth. Studies have shown that neither urban centres not the 
industrial sector for which major chunk of land have been acquired have helped in trickling 
down the benefits or creating employment for the people (Bhattacharya and Sakthivel 2004). 
In fact, land acquisition policy has created new forms of inequality that have changed the 
basic security system of farmers, tribals and other land dependent communities. In the 
scheme of cities as business models, the strategy of public land acquisition has largely been 
of a transfer of wealth from poorer sections to the corporates and real estate developers.  
The experience in several countries as evident from the papers in this volume suggest 
that the urbanization question is really a land question. As Shin shows in his chapter, the 
building of Songdo city of South Korea is based on the promise of real estate realization. In 
fact, Songdo City has seen the first foreign ownership of Korean soil where a parcel of 
reclaimed land was sold to a joint venture whose majority share was held by a US real estate 
developer. Thus while urbanization might be measured in economic growth rates, its 
continuous demand for land as cheap raw material highlights the terrain of governmentality 
beyond the normative questions of technical implementation and efficiency. 
What would cities look like if real estate was not seen as an indicator of growth under 
neoliberal urbanism? Would land still hold the same value for urbanization? Would land still 
need to be violently ‘tamed’ to serve the purposes of capital?  
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Sampat (2015) argues for ‘a legal framework for land- and resource-use that is locally 
determined, egalitarian and ecologically appropriate as a tool towards ushering a fundamental 
reconstitution from below.’ Democratizing the urban and rural land as commons will provide 
the opportunity to grassroots and marginalized communities to produce a slow economy that 
will be more sustainable in the long term. This includes both a legal framework for 
democratization that will not criminalize dissent and rights claims, and also a cultural 
transformation in the understanding of private property. Models of such democratization 
already exist in the form of Commons Property Management (CPR) more recently and the 
‘Bhoodan’ (land gift) and ‘Gramdan’ (village gift) movements in early 20th century India. 
These are also present in the form of Community Land Trusts in USA. These models 
themselves are not without their challenges, but it is worth discussing them briefly to explore 
their potential in achieving democratic resource use.  
Bhoodan and Gramdan movements in India emerged as a Gandhian ideology of 
‘sarvodaya’ (or development for all). Under this movement, the gifting of land (bhoodan) was 
seen as a non-violent process of land distribution to those at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy. Bhoodan was prevalent in India in the 1950-1960s and land transfers under this 
model were legalized by the state. It was also a socialist experiment based on the activism of 
prominent Gandhian ideologue Vinobha Bhave and in that sense was directed towards social 
justice and grassroots democracy. Gramdan followed in the years after Bhoodan where land 
from the entire village was handed over to the village community making every villager a 
stakeholder in the common property. The produce and earnings from the land was also shared 
collectively to benefit all villagers.  Land could not be sold or acquired without permission 
from the village council. Although these two movements had several weaknesses (related to 
record of land distribution and failure to transform historical social power) and faced several 
challenges in implementation (corruption, take up and commitment from the collective) at 
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larger scales, their ideology was translated and institutionalized in the USA as community 
land trusts. Community Land Trusts (CLT) which continue to this day are non-profit 
organizations which maintain collective access to land, property, housing and so on for 
communities in order to provide affordable, equitable and sustainable access to resources.  
What shape and form could such institutions of democratic commoning take in the 
global urban age? What future do these institutions have in a global neoliberal economy that 
drives fast urbanism in the global south? On the one hand, if these institutions work to their 
potential, they will provide blockades to the velocity of contemporary global urbanism. On 
the other hand, we cannot have a return of the same institutions given that the social, cultural, 
legal and political contexts in which they arose are now transformed. The postcolonial 
nation-state, in its role as neoliberal entrepreneur needs now more than ever before ‘to unlock 
land values’ in order to maintain its sovereignty and rule over territories. This ‘need’ however 
is sugar-coated in the language of public prosperity, of growth and development. Indeed 
recent institutions such as the Gramsabha (village council) in India have often worked as 
collaborators of private capital to the detriment of landless farmers. Using their powers, the 
gramsabha has tended to prioritize capital accumulation by sanctioning landuse change from 
agricultural to industrial purposes. This has shifted power and resources further into the 
hands of the landholding families, while dispossessing landless farmers. The reverse is seen 
in the Chinese Hukou system, where national household registers fixing populations to 
territories restrict rural migrants from accessing benefits in the urban commons. While they 
work and live in urban areas, they are unable to access affordable housing or bring their 
families to stay with them in the city. 
We still do not have all the necessary tools to understand the complexities and 
consequences of democratizing the commons. But what is clear is that any gesture in this 
direction will need to be backed up by strong policy and implementation. This necessarily 
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means slower processes of collectivization and activism to agree and demarcate commons 
property around resources such as land, waterbodies or forests. This also means finding 
alternatives for growth that are not rooted in the need for manipulating territory. It means 
finding new ways of urbanizing, new ways of governing and new ways of deliberating upon 
the encroachment from fast cities onto the commons. 
Provocation #4: Alternative utopias 
‘in order to extend the possible, it is necessary to proclaim and desire the impossible. 
Action and strategy consist in making possible tomorrow what is impossible today.’ Henri 
Lefebvre (1976, 36) 
The above provocation by Lefebvre is counter to the current urbanization model. Each 
of our provocations above follow this countercurrent by demanding a radical reorganisation 
of the very structures of the state and neoliberal urbanization. We hope to have shown that 
these are viable imaginations of more just futures, indeed of possible futures. The examples 
that we have used certainly suggest that the impossible can be made possible as long as we 
are able to imagine these. Indeed urban utopias are subjective. In other words, what seems 
impossible to some might be mundane and everyday to others.  
In his work of creative non-fiction, Darran Anderson (2015) notes in Imaginary Cities 
that a successful utopia will be a plurality. Moving away from the corporate driven 
imagination of utopia (in the form of big data, smart cities and Internet of Things) Darran 
notes that what was understood as utopia in the past are already here for many urban citizens 
in the form of piped water, electricity, jet planes, global communications and so on. The 
future and therefore utopian futures were all once utopian. When utopias are made possible, 
they become invisible, but they also exist in fragments. Crucially, he notes that it is only 
when they are taken away that we realise the utopian aspect of cities. He suggests that we 
need to define utopias in advance, to locate where the impossible possible does exist, to 
highlight them and critically emulate them elsewhere. It is only in rethinking how we 
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understand the past and the future that we can imagine a possible utopian future that is radical 
and socially just.  
Anderson’s (2015) notion of utopia presents several important questions. Where does 
the future begin and end when we are talking about utopias? Clearly if utopias are subjective, 
fragmented and spatio-temporal, then our notions of utopia need to change across time, and 
most importantly our assumptions of utopian impossibility needs rethinking. How does the 
notion of time wrapped up in the future reconstitute our very ideas of utopian thinking? How 
do we spatialize time, speed and duration when we imagine possible utopian futures? 
In the introduction to this book, Datta noted that speed is the new urban utopia. This 
notion of utopia refers to the forms of thinking that produced architectures and built 
environments of grandiose claims in the modernist period. This form of utopian thinking has 
received several elegies to their ‘paradoxical call to order, an atavistic alliance with 
modernist dreams of total environmental control’ (Martin 2010, 1). Indeed failed modernist 
utopias can be seen as the collective failure of the state and of the built environment 
professions of architecture and planning. The new utopias of fast cities now present new 
collective imaginations of state and corporate sector alliances. Social order in these new 
utopias is now largely vested in and through ICT architectures, where digitally directed 
planning and urban life is the imagination of the future. Digital communications, big data and 
Internet of Things are now ways to speed up fragmentary and uneven access to a previously 
unimagined future of ubiquitous connectivity.  
In this context of a neoliberal capture of utopian thought and praxis, what other 
alternative utopias can be imagined? How can utopian thinking move beyond the 
representation of efficiency, immediacy, convenience, and ubiquity (Johnson 2013; 
Anttiroiko 2013; Hollands 2008) to political stakes in rights, justice and citizenship? David 
Harvey (2000) in his book Spaces of Hope provides several provocations to think about more 
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hopeful urban futures. He argues that the purpose of utopia is not to ‘provide a blueprint for 
some future but to hold up for inspection the ridiculous foolishness and waste of the times, to 
insist that things could and must be better’ (1998, 281). He advocates a ‘dialectical 
utopianism’ (240) which means a radical project where the rule making nature of 
communities can confront the rule breaking nature of insurgent politics. For Harvey (2000), 
this dialectical utopia is not just spatial or temporal. Rather it is ‘spatio-temporal’, which 
means it requires the continuous rearrangement of the nature and purpose of imagined 
politics in different spaces, places and times. This involves experimentation with different 
material forms of utopian imaginations, ‘to explore the wide range of human potentialities’ 
(77) that must materialise in order to provide radical alternatives to authority and power. 
Where does that leave the possibilities of slow urbanism in the global south?  
In our final provocation we call for a utopian imagination of the ‘impossible possible’ 
(Lefebvre 1976) to emerge. This utopia emerges from outside the trappings of a global 
neoliberal urbanism or a postcolonial entrepreneurial state which have so far captured the 
rhetorics and practices of alternative urban futures. Its utopian praxis is reimagined as a 
radical alternative to the violence of speed as a logics of social order and control. This form 
of utopia imagines not just radically alternative urban futures but also radically alternative 
citizenships that are not held hostage to neoliberal compliance.   
Pinder (2005) calls this critical utopianism. For Pinder this is a ‘partisan of 
possibilities’ which needs to break away traditional top down ‘abstract ideals and formal 
plans’ (245) of blueprint utopias. It follows claims of Marxist scholars such as Lefebvre and 
Harvey in arguing that utopianism is a prerequisite for the imagination of emancipatory 
futures. Closing down or rejection of utopianism based on its historical attempts at 
concretising totalitarian social order is a closing down on debates on the possibilities of 
changes in social and political life. Following Lefebvre and Harvey, Pinder notes that a 
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critical utopianism recognises diversity of human experience and raises questions on the role 
of power in the making of cities and citizenships. Thus utopian thought and action are 
processes continually in the making and imagining of just urban futures by calling for a 
transformation of everyday life along the lines of justice, rights and equity.  It also means that 
utopian thought can reveal the inherent injustices, repressions and violence embodied by the 
urbanization of the state and citizenship even as it seeks to explore and imagine new 
possibilities and alternatives. 
Such a critical utopianism is inherently ‘slow’. It also ideologically opposed to the 
traditional format of utopian social engineering through built environment. This utopianism is 
dialectic and spatio-temporal and therefore directly relevant to the possibilities of a 
postcolonial critical urbanism. It is iterative and fluid which is informed by critical reflection 
on spaces, bodies and power. It sees the possibility of emancipatory futures only the 
continual imagination of alternatives to fast urbanization. Slow urbanism is a radical 
alternative utopia which aims to make the impossible possible, while resisting the idea that 
slow cities are the final outcome of critical utopianism. Slow urbanism is an embodied 
politics at several scales which conceives of a future that is open to impossible possibilities. 
As Doreen Massey would say, ‘only if we conceive of the future as open can we seriously 
accept or engage in any genuine notion of politics. Only if the future is open is there any 
ground for a politics which can make a difference.’ (Massey 2005, 11) 
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